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Abstract: In this paper I discuss Susan Haack’s illuminating
discussion and constructive critique of the current confusion regarding the standards of proof employed in the law, focusing especially on mathematical probability rather than warranted belief
interpretations of those standards. At the end, I question Haack’s
claim that statistical evidence is relevant not only for establishing the existence of a causal process but also, although usually insufficient by itself, for proving actual causation in a specific case.
Keywords: legal proof, epistemology, warranted belief, probability, statistics
Resumen: En este artículo me centro en la iluminadora discusión y en la crítica constructiva que Susan Haack desarrolla
respecto a la confusión actual sobre los estándares de prueba
empleados en la ley, centrándome especialmente en la probabilidad matemática, más que en las interpretaciones de creencia
garantizada de esos estándares. Al final cuestiono la afirmación
de Haack de que la evidencia estadística es relevante no solo
para establecer la existencia de un proceso causal, sino también,
aunque habitualmente sea insuficiente por sí misma, para proporcional una causación real en un caso específico.
Palabras clave: prueba legal, epistemología, creencia garantizada, probabilidad, estadística.
In a recent monograph, Susan Haack describes and constructively comments
on the considerable confusion that exists in legal doctrine and practice in the
United States regarding scientific evidence and proof of facts more generally1.
1

Susan Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2014.
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The issues upon which I will focus are the proper standards for adequate proof
in a legal proceeding of the truth of some fact and the proper methodology
for applying those standards. While Haack’s discussion focuses on the current
situation in the United States, her arguments apply generally, and, given the
intended audience for this publication, I will include some discussion of the
situation in civil law jurisdictions and in common law jurisdictions other than
the United States.
There has been little discussion or elaboration of the proper standards of
proof in civil law jurisdictions. The relevant code provisions, if any, merely state
the need for the judge(s) to be convinced regarding the truth of the facts at issue,
based on all the evidence in the case, without specifying any required degree of
conviction and usually not distinguishing between criminal and civil liability.
In France, it is stated that the judge must have an “intime conviction”, i.e., an
inner, personal, subjective belief in the truth of the facts at issue. The German
courts have stated that a degree of conviction is required that silences doubt
for all practical purposes without completely eliminating them. Insofar as the
standard is discussed in the legal doctrine, it is often assumed to require a virtual certainty in civil as well as criminal cases, but doubts have been cast on this
being true as a matter of actual practice, especially in civil cases. In any event,
there is agreement that what is required is a belief by the judge(s) in the truth of
the facts at issue, based on all the evidence in the case. A mere mathematical or
statistical probability, no matter how high, will not suffice2.
In common law jurisdictions, there is a clear distinction between the standard of proof in criminal cases, which requires proof “beyond a reasonable
doubt”, and the lower standard applied in civil cases, which is usually stated
as proof by the “preponderance [or greater weight] of the evidence” in the
United States and by the “balance of probability” in the English Commonwealth. Sometimes an intermediate “clear and convincing” evidence standard is used. Both the balance of probability standard and the preponderance
standard, which is often rephrased or interpreted as a “more probable/likely
than not” standard, are often interpreted by academics, and sometimes by
judges, as merely requiring a greater than 50 per cent probability, which in
turn is often interpreted as a mere mathematical or statistical probability3.
As Haack explains, legal adjudication is supposed to determine the truth
regarding the propositions and facts at issue in the particular case, subject to
the constraints of limited resources and time4. Literal interpretations of the

2

Richard W Wright, “Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief”, in Richard Goldberg
(ed.), Perspectives on Causation, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 195, 197–199.

3

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 16–18, 50–54; John Leubsdorf, “The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil Proof”, in Florida Law Review 57 (2015) 1569, 1571–1576.

4

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 55–56.
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phrases “preponderance [or greater weight] of the evidence” and, even more
so, “more likely than not” and “balance of probability”, do not require a determination regarding the truth of the facts at issue5. However, Haack notes,
references in jury instructions to “more probable/likely than not” are generally stated as “more probable/likely than not true”, and almost all of the
preponderance or greater weight jury instructions in the United States contain
references to persuasion, conviction, belief and/or truth6. She also observes
that probability language is ambiguous: it is often used, even today, to refer to
degrees of belief rather than mathematical or statistical probability7.
An understanding of each of the standards of proof as referring to required
warranted degrees of belief, as argued by Haack8, is supported by John Leubsdorf’s recent study of all of the available historical sources in the United
States and England. Leubsdorf reports that, prior to the nineteenth century,
judges did not employ either the preponderance standard or the balance of
probability standard in jury instructions, although academics and, to a lesser extent, judicial opinions began referring to the preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence toward the end of the eighteenth century. Judges told
jurors a lot about the issues and evidence, but said little about any standard
for appraising the evidence. However, when judges did express or intimate
a standard, it was that jurors should follow their consciences and decide for
a party when satisfied that the party’s assertions were correct9. Instructions
requiring juries to base their findings on the preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence did not appear in jury instructions in the United States until
the middle of the nineteenth century and apparently were rarely if ever employed in England. Instead, the balance of probability standard started to be
employed in jury instructions in England toward the end of the nineteenth
century and rapidly increased in use during the first quarter of the twentieth
century, while references in judicial opinions to the preponderance standard
have continued to this day10.
Leubsdorf was unable to find any sources to explain the shift to the balance
of probability standard in England11. However, both it and the preponderance
standard were developed in an environment in which whatever instructions
did exist often referred to a required belief by the jury in the truth of the facts
at issue12, and, even more so than now, “probability” was often used to refer
5

Ibid., pp. 62–63; John Leubsdorf, op. cit., pp. 1571–76

6

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 18, 52–54; see. e.g., text at notes 15–16 below.

7

Ibid., pp. 56–58, 286–287.

8

See text at notes 18–20 below.

9

John Leubsdorf, op. cit., pp. 1583–1591.

10

Ibid., pp. 1570–1571, 1607–1614.

11

Ibid., pp. 1611–1612.

12

Ibid., pp. 1588–1591, 1602, 1606, 1608–1609, 1615.
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to a degree of belief warranted by the evidence rather than to a mathematical or statistical probability13. For example, in an influential statement in his
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke employed probability
language to refer to varying degrees of belief based on the preponderance of
the evidence:
Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability… The Difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience,
and the Reports of History and Witnesses clash with the ordinary Course
of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and
Exactness is required to form a right Judgment, and to proportion the Assent
to the different Evidence and Probability of the Thing, which rises and falls
according as those two Foundations of Credibility, viz. Common Observation in like Cases, and particular testimonies in that particular Instance,
favour or contradict it… This only may be said in general, that as the Arguments and Proofs, pro and con, upon due Examination, nicely weighing
every particular Circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole
Matter, in a greater or less Degree to preponderate on either Side, so they are
fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainment, as we call Belief,
Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief, &c14.

There thus is good reason to believe that, contrary to common interpretations today of the balance of probability standard as requiring only a mathematical or statistical probability, it was originally meant to have the same
meaning and effect as the preponderance standard, with both being understood as referring to a required minimal degree of belief based on and warranted by the evidence. Modern jury instructions in the United States continue
to focus on required degrees of belief and to treat the various phrasings of the
ordinary standard of proof in civil cases as interchangeable. For example, the
two major sets of model federal jury instructions state, in part:
“Establish by a preponderance of the evidence” means evidence which, as
a whole, shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
In other words, a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as,
when considered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more
convincing force, and produces in your minds belief that what is sought to
be proved is more likely true than not true15.
13

Ibid., pp. 1595–1599.

14

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, vol. 2, London, 17th ed., 1775, pp.
282–283.

15

Kevin F. O’Malley et al., 3 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions–Civil, 6th ed., St Paul, Thomson/West, 2006, § 104.01; see State Bar of Nevada, Nevada Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil,
Charlottesville, Michie, 1986, § 3.00.1 (“The term ‘preponderance of the evidence’ means such
evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from
which it appears that the greater probability of truth lies therein.”).
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To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that
the fact is more likely true than not true. A preponderance of the evidence
means the greater weight of the evidence. It refers to the quality and persuasiveness of the evidence, not to the number of witnesses or documents… So
long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the party
with [the] burden of proof—that what the party claims is more likely true
than not true—then that element will have been proved by a preponderance
of evidence16.

As the second instruction illustrates, the usually required degree of belief
in a civil case is a minimal threshold belief, as compared with the stronger degrees of belief required by the “clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard17. However, Haack emphasizes, a mere subjective
belief regarding the facts, no matter how strong, is insufficient. What is required, epistemologically and legally, is a belief in the truth of the alleged facts
that is justified or warranted to the required degree by the available evidence.
Jury instructions require that the jury’s determination be based solely on, and
at least implicitly justified by, the evidence in the case18. The objective nature
of the legally required degree of belief is evidenced by the power and duty
of judges to rule as a matter of law for one of the parties, rather than leaving
assessment of the facts to the jury, if but only if a contrary conclusion could
not reasonably be supported even if all the conflicting evidence were viewed
in favor of the other party19. Significantly, references to the preponderance
standard occurred initially in this context, prior to its use in jury instructions20.
But what criteria should be used by judges or juries to assess whether the
evidence in a case reasonably could or should be found sufficient to warrant a
required degree of belief about some asserted proposition or fact? Haack’s answer to this basic epistemological question provides the foundation for all of
her analyses. She describes her account as being “evidentialist, experientialist,
gradational, foundherentist, quasi-holistic, and worldly”21. It is “evidentialist” because it assumes that whether, and, if so, to what degree, a person is justified in believing in something depends on how good his evidence, including
16

Leonard B. Sand et al., 4 Modern Federal Jury Instructions–Civil, New York, Matthew Bender
& Co., 2018, ¶ 73.03.

17

See also, e.g., Livanovich v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799, 800 (Vermont 1926) (“If ... you are more
inclined to believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds… even though your
belief is only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be for the
plaintiff.”); John Leubsdorf, op. cit., p. 1595 (“The preponderance of the evidence standards...
tells the trier to decide for [a] party if the evidence moves the trier’s belief just a bit beyond
the point of suspense.”)

18

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 17–18, 52–56.

19

Ibid., pp. 54–55.

20

John Leubsdorf, op. cit., pp. 1599–1601.

21

Susan Haack, op. cit., p. 12.
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both his experiential evidence and his background beliefs or reasons, is. It is
“experientalist” because it takes the evidence with respect to empirical claims
to include a subject’s sensory experience. It is “gradational” because it considers the quality of evidence (and hence of espistemic justification) to be a
matter of degree; it may be stronger or weaker. It is “foundherentist” because
it is intermediate between the two traditional rival epistemological theories,
foundationalism and coherentism22. Unlike coherentism but like some forms
of foundationalism, it provides a role for experiential evidence as well as for
reasons. Unlike foundationalism, which assumes that support for beliefs is
linear and asymmetric, but like coherentism, it relies upon relations of mutual
support among beliefs. It is “wordly” because it depends on relevant facts
about the real world23. It is “quasi-holistic” because “it is neither atomistic (as
foundationalist theories usually are), nor fully holistic (as coherentist theories
usually are). The evidence relevant to a claim is usually complex and ramifying, but not everything is relevant to everything”24.
The specific details of Haack’s foundherentist theory, which support all of
these adjectives, combine consideration of three factors. The warrant for a particular belief is a matter of degree and depends on consideration of: (1) how
supportive the evidence is of the belief, i.e., how well the body of evidence (experiential evidence and background beliefs) fits together with the conclusion
in a coherent explanatory account; (2) how secure the background beliefs and
reasons are, independent of the belief in question; and (3) how comprehensive
the (relevant) evidence is25. The focus is not, as literal interpretations of the preponderance, greater weight and more likely than not standards of proof would
suggest, on which party has presented better evidence in quantity or quality or
has a better story. The party without the burden of proof on some issue need not
present any evidence on that issue. What is required, and all that is required,
is that the party with the burden of proof have produced evidence sufficient to
warrant the required degree of belief in the truth of its claim26.

22

For discussion of foundationalism, coherentism and other epistemological theories, see David A. Truncellito, “Epistemology”, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.
utm.edu/epistemo/#SH2d.

23

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 12–13, 15.

24

Ibid., p. 15.

25

Ibid., pp. 14–15, 60–61, 218–19, 222–26. Haack uses an analogy with a crossword puzzle to
illustrate the application of her three factors. Ibid., pp. 13–14, 60–61. The clues are the analog
of the experiential evidence, and the already filled-in entries are the analog of the background
beliefs that serve as reasons for our other beliefs. She anticipates an objection that the second
factor may be thought to be circular: “The independent security requirement applies only to
the reasons for a belief, not to the experiential evidence that ultimately grounds our beliefs
about the world; and this experiential evidence consists of events, not propositions, and so
neither has nor stands in need of justification.” Ibid., pp. 14–15.

26

Ibid., pp. 21, 60 and note 73, 62 and note 80.
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As Haack explains, the references in the great majority of jury instructions
in the United States to persuasion, conviction or belief in the truth of the facts
at issue in the particular case, based on evidence specific to that case, are inconsistent with a standard of proof based on mathematical probability27. Given the multi-dimensional nature of the factors to be considered in determining
the warrant for a particular belief and the non-numerical gradational rather
than numerically linear nature of the resulting degrees of warrant, mathematical probability theory could neither serve by itself as a theory of warrant nor
serve as a way of computing degrees of warrant under some other theory28.
She further notes, as others have29, the failure of degrees of belief to adhere
to the axioms of mathematical probability theory, including the negation and
conjunction axioms:
[Negation] The mathematical probability of (p and not-p) must add up to 1;
but when there is no evidence, or only very weak evidence, either way, neither p nor not-p is warranted to any degree.
[Conjunction] The mathematical probability of (p & q) [if they are independent events] is the product of the probability of p and the probability of
q—which, unless both have a probability of 1, is always less than either; but
combined evidence may warrant a claim to a higher degree than any of its
components alone would do30.

The conjunction issue is especially problematic for a mathematical probability theory of legal proof, which assumes that something is proven if its
probability is greater than 0.5. In legal practice, as stated in jury instructions,
the claim as a whole is proven if the relevant standard of proof is satisfied as
applied separately to each required element of the case. Under mathematical
probability theory, however, one must combine by multiplication the probability for each required element to get the probability for the case as a whole.
In order to get a probability greater than 0.5 for the case as a whole, the probability of each required element must be much higher than 0.5, and increasingly higher the more elements that have to be proved. E.g., if p and q each
independently have a probability of 0.6, the probability of (p & q) is only 0.3631.
The mathematical probabilists’ assumption that the standard of proof in a
civil action merely requires a greater than 0.5 mathematical probability leads
to further paradoxes. A major one is illustrated by Jonathan Cohen’s famous
27

Ibid., pp. 18, 59–64, 76–77, 286–287, 291.

28

Ibid., pp. 14, 19, 47–48, 61–62, 286–287.

29

Initially, L. Jonathan Cohen, The Provable and the Probable, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, pp.
49–120.

30

Susan Haack, op. cit., p. 62; see ibid., pp. 62–64, 208–38, 287.

31

Ibid., p. 63.
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gatecrasher hypothetical, in which only 499 of 1000 attendees at an event had
tickets, but all those with tickets surrendered them upon entry, and there is
no means of identifying who paid for their tickets once they have been surrendered. Each of the 1000 attendees can be found guilty of gatecrashing by
applying the mathematical probabilists’ standard of proof, even though there
is no specific proof regarding any attendee and it is clearly not true that all of
them were gatecrashers32.
Almost all mathematical probabilists agree that this result is unjust or at
least improper. Many of them attempt to avoid the result in the gatecrasher scenario and similar real and hypothetical situations by, e.g., assuming, contrary to
the actual or assumed facts, that there was missing evidence that, if taken into
account using Bayes’s Theorem to adjust initial probabilities in the light of additional evidence, would reduce the mathematical probability below 50 per cent33.
As Haack states, they use Bayes’s Theorem in an attempt to avoid the conjunction paradox and supposedly pay attention to degrees of belief. She examines
book-length attempts to demonstrate the application of Bayes’s Theorem to two
famous cases and finds that neither attempt delivers on its promise but rather
is a confusing application of bewildering mathematical probability analysis to
varying assumed degrees of belief that are actually assigned objective probabilities, while ignoring the inapplicability of mathematical probability theory
to the formulation and assessment of beliefs. She then helpfully employs her
foundherentist theory to illustrate how it provides a much more comprehensible, enlightening and plausible analysis of the evidence in each case.34
Even if the mathematical probabilists’ use of Bayes’s Theorem (which
itself is a valid mathematical formula) were valid, it would not avoid the
paradoxical results of applying mathematical probability theory to actual
or supposed degrees of belief. For example, in the gatecrasher hypothetical, assume that only one of the thousand spectators purchased a ticket, the
ticket collector identifies X as the one who entered with a ticket, and there is
a 98 per cent degree of confidence in the ticket collector’s testimony. Using
the naked statistic that 99.9 per cent of the spectators were gatecrashers as
the initial base rate in Bayes’s Theorem, the revised probability that X was
a gatecrasher, even after taking into account the ticket seller’s case-specific
identification testimony, would still be over 95 per cent. The mathematical
probabilists are forced to conclude that X almost surely was a gatecrasher,
and indeed should be held criminally liable under their interpretation of
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as well as civilly liable under the
32

L. Jonathan Cohen, op. cit., p. 75.

33

See Richard W Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts”, in Iowa Law Review 73 (1988)
1001, 1055–1061.

34

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 64–77.
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preponderance standard, despite the ticket seller’s highly credible testimony that X was not a gatecrasher35.
Some of the mathematical probabilists claim to have resolved or refuted
the paradoxes created by their mathematical probability based theories of
proof. However, as Haack discusses, they have not done so. Instead, as is
illustrated by their reactions to the gatecrasher hypothetical, they have engaged in evasion, obfuscation and convoluted arguments36. Others believe
that the tension between the warranted belief and probability theories of
proof can be and has been resolved by the view that the jury must indeed be
convinced, but convinced only that a claim was more probable than not in
a mathematical or statistical probability sense37. As Leubsdorf notes, “that
view is not really a compromise because it reduces to almost nothing the
role of the jury’s belief”38.
Nevertheless, unacknowledged policy considerations or, much more likely,
courts’ confusion regarding the proper meaning of the legal standards of proof
have led them erroneously to employ mathematical probability interpretations
of those standards in some categories of cases in which proper proof is impossible. Haack describes and criticizes the development of the doubling the risk
criterion for proving specific causation in the toxic tort cases39. In these cases, as
in the medical malpractice cases involving negligent diagnosis or delayed treatment40, it is generally impossible to prove specific causation in the proper way,
by sufficient proof of instantiation of the relevant causal processes by concrete
evidence in the particular case41, due to a lack of scientific knowledge regarding
the details of the relevant causal process as well as a general inability to obtain
needed case-specific information. As a matter of policy or, much more often, due
to confusion regarding the standards of proof, courts have erroneously treated
a mere abstract, class-based, greater than 50 per cent statistical probability as
proof of actual causation in a specific case, despite the lack of any case-specific
evidence of causation other than exposure to the harmful substance, based on a
statistical probability interpretation of the “more likely than not” version of the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof42.
35

Richard W Wright, “Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts”, p. 1061 note
321.

36

Ibid., p. 1066 note 341; Susan Haack, op. cit., p. 67 and note 96.

37

E.g., Sandy Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p.
101.

38

John Leubsdorf, op. cit., p. 1604.

39

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 270–288.

40

Richard W Wright, “Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief”, pp. 216–219.

41

Ibid., pp. 205–212.

42

Ibid., pp. 215–219. A third doctrinal area in which the courts, due to the unavailability of sufficient case-specific evidence, have misinterpreted the standards of proof as requiring only

525

R I C H A R D W. W R I G H T

The courts usually recognize the fallacy of treating a mere class-based statistical probability, as in the gatecrasher scenario, as sufficient proof of what happened in any specific case43. When judges or lay persons are asked in surveys
to interpret the standards of proof as mathematical probabilities, they either
refuse or state probabilities much greater than those assumed by the mathematical probabilists44. However, over the last few decades many (but far from all)
courts in the United States in toxic tort cases have treated a more than doubled
statistical risk of suffering some disease or disorder due to exposure to some
substance as sufficient, and perhaps necessary, to establish causation of that
disease or disorder in a specific case (“specific causation”), assuming that it has
been established that exposure to that substance is capable of causing that disease or disorder (“general causation”)45. Haack devotes most of her recent book
to illuminating and extremely useful discussion of the general causation issue.
She criticizes the various criteria stated by the courts for establishing general
causation, especially the criteria discussed and the atomized approach taken
in Judge Kozinski’s opinion for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in the Daubert case46, and she persuasively argues for the use of a more holistic
approach based on her foundherentist methodology47.
Although Haack insists that degrees of belief should not and cannot be
identified with or interpreted as mathematical probabilities and are not
amenable to analysis in accordance with mathematical probability theory,
and that statistical evidence is almost never by itself sufficient for a warranted belief regarding the facts in a specific case but rather requires supporting case-specific evidence, she argues that statistical evidence is always
relevant not only with respect to general causation but also with respect to
specific causation and can provide significant support for a warranted belief
regarding identity or specific causation in a particular case depending on its
magnitude, detail, accuracy and comprehensiveness48. Applying her foundherentist methodology, she argues:

a greater than 50 percent statistical probability is the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to
permit proof of negligence as well as causation. Ibid., pp. 219–220.
43

Ibid., pp. 201–204, 212–214; Richard W. Wright, “Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the
Concepts”, pp. 1050–1051.

44

John Leubsdorf, op. cit., p. 1578; Richard W. Wright, “Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts”, pp. 1065-1066 note 339.

45

Susan Haack, op. cit., pp. 270–285.

46

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).

47

Susan Haack, op. cit., ch. 5 (“Trial and Error: Two Confusions in Daubert”), ch. 6 (“Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—and a Reconstruction”), ch. 7 (“Peer Review and Publication:
Lessons for Lawyers”), ch. 8 (“What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science?”), ch. 9 (“Proving
Causation: The Weight of Combined Evidence”), ch. 10 (“Correlation and Causation: The ‘Bradford Hill Criteria’ in Epidemiological, Legal, and Epistemological Perspective”).

48

Ibid., pp. 18–20, 72, 74–75, 286–289.
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Any increase in relative risk, however small, is supportive of the conclusion [regarding specific causation] to some degree. Why so? Because how
supportive evidence is with respect to some conclusion depends on how
well that evidence and that conclusion fit together in an explanatory story.
And if D is commoner among people exposed to S than among people not
exposed to S, it is possible that Mr. X is one of those who would not have
developed D but for his exposure to S, and since his exposure to S might
explain Mr. X’s developing D, it supports the conclusion to some degree (a
higher degree, the higher the relative risk)49.

Haack acknowledges that “[u]nless the relative risk is very high, however, the degree of support such evidence gives the conclusion is very modest,
for—since we lack any specific, detailed, explanatory story—the explanatory
integration of evidence and conclusion is quite loose”50. How high is very
high? In a 2014 interview, she stated: “[I]f you can show that the risk if you’re
exposed to this stuff is 200 times the risk if you’re not, then that’s pretty strong
evidence of causation by itself”51.
I respectfully disagree. Although causally related statistical evidence is relevant and usually very helpful—but, as Haack explains, is not required52—for
proof of general causation (the capacity of some condition to cause a distinct condition), once general causation is established the statistics provide no support to
a warranted conclusion regarding specific causation. While abstract class-based
statistics are useful for predicting a result ex ante, or betting on a result ex post, they
tell us nothing about what actually happened in a specific case. For example, if
there are 95 blue marbles and 5 red marbles in a jar, one should bet that the next
marble randomly drawn from the jar will be a blue marble, but no one will pay
off on such a bet until they have specific evidence that the ball actually was blue.
This is especially true with respect to so-called “naked statistics”, unrelated to any causal generalization, such as the defendant’s proportion of taxis
operated in a specific locale, bolts supplied to a manufacturer, or doses distributed of a generic drug, when some injury was caused by a non-specifically-identified taxi, defective bolt, or dose of a drug53. Haack herself mentions
an English case in which there was a very high statistical probability that a
match of the defendant’s DNA with DNA found at the crime scene was not
random, but it was clear that he could not have committed the crime since he
was so handicapped by advanced Parkinson’s disease that he was physically
49

Ibid., p. 287–288

50

Ibid., p. 288.

51

https://www.academia.edu/23523493/EVIDENCE_MATTERS_Transcript_of_Robert_Talisses_podcast_interview_with_Susan_Haack_2016, p. 21._

52

Susan Haack, op. cit., p. 290.

53

Richard W. Wright, “Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts”, pp. 1050–1051,
1054–1064.
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incapable of having committed it.54 Recall also the gatecrasher hypothetical in
which there was a 99.9 per cent statistical probability, reduced to just over 95
per cent by the use of Bayes’s Theorem, that X was a gatecrasher, but the ticket
collector testified that X was the sole ticketed entrant55.
The same problem exists for causally related statistics, which report the frequency of complete instantiation of a partially instantiated causal law (a causal
generalization). They are of no use in establishing which possibly applicable
causal generalizations were actually instantiated in the particular situation because they provide no information on whether the abstract elements in the underlying causal laws that are not included in the causal generalization actually
were instantiated on that occasion. The causally related statistic merely states
that, on average or in the aggregate, X per cent of the time that the abstract
elements specified in the causal generalization are instantiated, the unspecified
abstract elements required to complete the underlying causal laws are also instantiated. It does not help us determine whether this particular occasion is one
of the X per cent in which the underlying causal laws were fully instantiated, or
instead is one of the 100–X per cent in which they were not.
As Haack acknowledges, we need a “specific, detailed, [filled in] explanatory
story”56. Only evidence specific to the particular occasion is capable of instantiating the conditions in the relevant causal laws and their generalizations. Since
a causal generalization is not a complete specification of the underlying causal
laws, proof of instantiation of even all of the antecedent conditions in the causal
generalization provides only an aggregate class-based statistical probability that
the underlying causal laws were completely instantiated and, thus, that the condition at issue actually was a cause of the relevant consequence. Nevertheless, the
proven actual conditions in the specific situation may provide sufficient direct
and circumstantial evidence regarding instantiation of the network of causal processes in the specific situation to warrant the formation of a belief, rather than a
mere class-based statistical probability, that a specific causal generalization and
its underlying causal laws were instantiated in the specific situation57.
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See text at note 35 above.

56

See text at note 50 above.

57

Richard W. Wright, “Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief”, pp. 205–212.

528

